Abstract-This paper presents a storage enforcing remote verification scheme, PGV (Pretty Good Verification). While existing schemes are often developed to handle a malicious adversarial model, we argue that such a model is often too strong of an assumption, resulting in overengineered, resource-intensive mechanisms. Instead, the storage enforcement property of PGV aims at removing a practical incentive for a storage server to cheat in order to save on storage space in a covert adversarial model.
I. INTRODUCTION
A general structure of the remote storage verification problem is the following: a verifier (client) (i) uploads its data to a remote prover (cloud storage), (ii) deletes the local copy (to save on storage), and (iii) at some later point, tries to verify if the prover is storing the data correctly i.e. assurance of integrity and retrievability. Existing PDP or POR schemes [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] consider a malicious adversarial model [6] , which translates to assuming that legitimate cloud storage providers such as Amazon will behave arbitrarily to tamper with client's data. In order to satisfy this strict adversarial model, existing schemes are complex (including modification of original data [2] , [4] , [7] ) and performance inefficient (both in time and space requirements [1] , [7] , [3] , [5] ).
The primary motivation for this paper is to show that if we relax this strict adversarial model and focus instead on a more practical adversarial model, we can develop a simpler, far more light-weight verification scheme. Therefore, instead of considering a malicious adversarial model, we consider a covert adversarial model [8] . This model assumes that the adversary is willing to cheat if: (i) it has some incentive, and (ii) it will not be caught. It nicely captures many real world scenarios including remote storage verification where there is a practical incentive for a provider to cheat in order to save on storage as long as it is not caught. This is more practical since storage is the main commodity for storage providers-a storage provider typically charges its clients primarily for the amount of storage that each client uses. Also, the provider incurs a significant amount of cost in handling and managing the storage for its clients such as the costs for hard drives, storage area networking, and power consumption [9] , [10] . Thus, there is a practical incentive for a provider to cheat in order to save on storage.
The main contribution of this paper is a storage enforcing remote verification scheme, PGV (Pretty Good Verification). This means roughly that, in order to pass our verification, a provider has to commit as much storage space as the information content of the original data. This removes storage savings as an incentive of cheating for the provider. We also show that PGV has application in proof of ownership [11] , which is a server verifying client storage scenario for deduplication. Due to the limited capacity of client devices such as smartphones, the computation that runs at the client-side has to be lightweight. Further, the client is not expected to modify the data to aid in the verification process (as it is needed in some existing PDP/POR schemes). PGV is lightweight and does not modify the original data, which makes it a good choice for proof of ownership as well.
We have implemented our widely applicable storage enforcing remote verification scheme, PGV and evaluated it through extensive experiments with data files of sizes 1 MB to 1 GB. Our experimental results demonstrate that PGV is significantly performance efficient compared to existing proof of data possession (PDP [1] ) and proof of ownership (PoW [11] ) schemes.
II. PRETTY GOOD VERIFICATION

A. Basic Scheme
The scheme has two main phases: pre-processing and hash generation and challenge generation and verification phase.
Pre-processing and hash generation: To compute a polynomial hash, a verifier needs to pick system-wide parameters once and perform three steps in the preprocessing phase. There are two system-wide parameters: the finite field size q (e.g., 2 32 or equivalently, 4B) and the block size (e.g., 64KB). Picking the right values for these parameters involves considerations for performance and security. We discuss these considerations in our evaluation in Section IV.
Once the verifier finishes picking the system-wide parameters, the verifier can compute a polynomial hash for each data block: (i) pick a random number (our key) β from the field, (ii) divide the data block into equalsized symbols, S 0 , . . . , S k−1 , where the size is equal to the field size (e.g., 4B), and (iii) compute the polynomial hash H c = ∑ k−1 i=0 S i β i . This is equivalent to computing a single entry in a Reed-Solomon code word. This process is per-block. For a file, there is one additional step that divides the file into blocks. Then the verifier needs to repeat the above three steps for each block. Once the polynomial hash is computed for each block, the verifier stores the random keys and hash values locally and uploads the file to remote storage.
Challenge generation and verification: To verify a data block in a storage enforcing fashion, the verifier sends the key β associated with that block to the remote storage. The remote storage computes the polynomial hash H c = ∑ k−1 i=0 S i β i and sends back to the verifier. If this hash matches the locally stored hash by the verifier, the verification succeeds.
B. Summary of Our Guarantees
We can summarize our two main results for remote verification as follows:
• If the prover can pass our verification protocol with a probability greater than ε (where ε can be made to be very small, e.g. 1%), then the prover must provably store almost as much as the Kolmogorov complexity ( [12] , [13] ) of the user string. Another way to state this is that, if, for example, ε = 1% and the prover stores slightly less than Kolmogorov complexity C(x), then the prover will be caught with probability at least 99%.
• If the prover can pass our verification protocol with a probability greater than 1/2+γ (where γ can be very small, e.g. 1%), then the prover has enough information to recreate the user string. Another way to state this is that, if, for example, γ = 1% and the prover cannot recreate the user data, then it will be caught with probability at least 49%.
C. Proof Sketch
Due to space constraints, we briefly provide the proof sketches in this section and omit the detailed proofs which are available in our technical report [14] .
The proof of storage enforcement uses the plain Kolmogorov complexity C(x) of original data x, which is the size of the smallest algorithmic description of x. The reason why we enforce C(x) instead of x is because we cannot prevent a prover from compressing x; C(x) is a natural way to represent the amount of information stored in x. The proof is based on a contradiction that if there is a way for the prover to pass our verification without storing close to C(x) amount of data, then there is an algorithm to describe x with size < C(x).
PGV also has a weaker form of proof of retrievability property, i.e., it can be used to verify that a remote party has enough information to recreate the data that it claims to store with good probability. Since PGV is based on the polynomial hash ( [15] , [16] ), the proof of retrievability is built up on the fact that a polynomial hash is just a single entry in an appropriately-chosen Reed-Solomon code word. By applying any efficient unique decoding algorithm for Reed-Solomon code (e.g. the well-known Berlekamp-Massey algorithm), it is possible to get back the original data.
The proofs and the scheme itself, in fact, generalize to any error-correcting code and corresponding universal hash function as outlined in our technical report [14] .
III. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS AND EXTENSIONS
Well-known cryptographic remote verification scheme such as PDP [1] provides sampling and repeatability properties. Sampling aims at providing probabilistic guarantee of storage verification by checking a constant number of data blocks. The repeatability property of PDP supports the usage of same cryptographic credentials for unlimited verification. PGV inherently supports sampling since it is designed for complete verification. However, the basic PGV scheme does not support repeatability. In this section, we discuss a probabilistic framework of sampling as well as practical ways to overcome the repeatability issue of PGV. We also comparatively analyze these extensions of PGV with PDP.
A. Sampling
Although PGV prefers and is able to efficiently handle complete verification of the data (i.e. all the data blocks in a file), PDP uses sampling to scale with the increment in file sizes. To make a fair comparison, we now discuss a probabilistic framework of error detection using PGV. Assume a scenario where the server cheats 1 t blocks out of an n-block file. Assume, r PDP and r PGV be the number of sampled blocks during the verification in PDP and PGV, respectively. Let p be the probability that the server can avoid detection of its cheating. For PDP, p is the probability that none of the sampled blocks match the blocks on which the server cheats; i.e., we 
B. Repeatability
PGV can overcome the bounded repeatability by piggybacking the generation of new hashs with regular block access operations. To make the discussion more concrete, let us compare PDP (which has unbounded repeatability) and PGV (with the piggybacking scheme). In particular let (g PDP , v PDP ) and (g PGV , v PGV ) be the generation time and verification time for one block for PDP and PGV respectively. Further define R g = g PDP g PGV . Let B be the maximum number of hashs that the PGV keeps at any point of time per block. Since PDP has unbounded repeatability, it only needs to store one hash 1 Cheating in the case of PGV means that the server stores less than the Kolmogorov complexity of the block. This can handle the case when sufficient bits from a block has been erased. For PDP this means that the server alters the block so that it cannot re-create the original block.
per block. Next we try to figure out what B should be in order to keep the overall overhead of PGV still smaller than PDP.
At the beginning both PDP and PGV need to generate the hashs. Thus, PGV spends B · g PGV time while PDP spends g PDP time. Thus, to be ahead of PDP at this stage, we need to make sure
Now later on, we will have verification for the block interspersed with normal reads for the block. Let us assume that C > 0 is the maximum number of verification calls between two normal reads for a block. Now consider any "run" of x consecutive verification calls followed by a normal read (so we have x C). Note that in this case for PGV we (i) need to make sure that B x as we cannot "replenish" the buffer till get to the normal read and (ii) make sure that the overhead incurred by PGV is smaller than PDP. For (ii) we note that the time expended by PDP is x · v PDP while the time expended by PGV is x(v PGV + g PGV ) (as it needs to perform x verifications and replenish as many hashs in its buffer). Thus, PGV would have a lower overhead if
Note that we have ended up with the following constraints on B: C B R g .
In our experiments (Section IV), we have found that (2) is satisfied. (In fact, we observe that g PGV v PGV . Further, v PDP 10 · g PGV , which implies that PDP is at least five times as slow as PGV with B hashs during the verification phase.) Finally, we observe in our experiments that R g 10. So if we pick B = C and if we have C < 10 (the latter is a realistic assumption for the cloud computing applications we envision for PGV), then PGV comes out ahead even in the hash generation part.
IV. CLIENT VERIFYING STORAGE PROVIDER EXPERIMENTS
This section presents various performance aspects of PGV as well as comparisons with the performance of a crypto-based scheme, PDP [1] . We emphasize that we have only considered the main scheme in PDP, although there are many variants of the main scheme. Since the variants of the main scheme make design tradeoffs on multiple properties, it is difficult for us to consider those variants altogether. 
A. Experimental Platform and Parameters
We use open source C libraries on an Intel Centrino Duo machine at 1.73 GHz with 2.5 GB memory running Linux kernel 2.6.32 to compare PGV with existing schemes. We use a single thread in all implementation and measurements. For cryptographic operations, we use OpenSSL 0.9.8k. For field operations and erasure coding, we use James Plank's Galois field library [17] and Jerasure library [18] .
B. Hash Generation Time
For PDP, the hash generation time includes the time required to generate the asymmetric keys, file I/O and per-block hash generation time. Figure 4 shows the hash generation time comparison between PDP and PGV. (For both schemes we used a block size of 16K.) As shown in the figure, PGV has little overhead as it just evaluates the polynomial hash. PDP has higher overhead as it relies on computationally intensive cryptographic primitives. It uses asymmetric cryptographic primitive based on modular exponentiation. On average, PGV is approximately 25 times faster than PDP in hash generation for different file sizes. Figure 5 compares PDP verification time with PGV considering both completeness (i.e. in both cases we verify all the blocks) and sampling (Section III-A with the following setting of parameters: t/n = 1%, p = 1%, α = .8 and q = 2 32 ). PDP incurs the most overhead due to asymmetric cryptographic operations in all three phases. It also shows the sampling verification time with 99% detection rate. As discussed earlier, in the probabilistic framework, PDP can guarantee 99% detection Figure 3 shows the PGV storage overhead for different file sizes and block sizes. Comparison of storage overhead with PDP is shown in Figure 6 . PDP stores its tokens (authenticators) on the server side. These hashs are usually 1024 bits long. Unlike these schemes, PGV does not have any server-side storage overhead. We only need to store hashs at the client side.
C. Challenge Generation, Verification, and Sampling Analysis
D. Storage overhead
V. SERVER VERIFYING CLIENT EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we compare PGV with PoW [11] in terms of client time (the time required by the prover to compute the proof of ownership of deduplicated data). We also compare both of the schemes' network time to a naive approach where, instead of deduplication, the complete file is transfered over the network. Figure 7 compares client times for PGV and PoW for different file sizes. As we can see from the figure, PGV performs faster than PoW in client time for the reported file sizes from 32MB to 512MB. However, as the file size increases, the performance follows similar trend. For instance, PoW and PGV takes 15.29 sec and 16.98 sec, respectively for a 1024 MB file. However, note that PoW is optimized only for proof of ownership whereas PGV supports two-way verification with proof of storage enforcement.
A. Client time
B. Network time
Network time in PGV corresponds to sending a random number β to the client and getting the computed hash back from the client. As we have discussed in Section IV-C, PGV can guarantee 99% detection by checking 483 blocks. In total, PGV transfers around 30K data on the network as a part of the protocol data. For similar guarantees, PoW reports 20K data transfer requirement as it needs to transfer 20 leaves to the provers. Figure 8 shows the overall time (client time and network time) required by PGV and PoW, compared to a naive scheme which always transfers the complete file over the network without deduplication for different file sizes. Our results show that PGV performs better than both PoW and the naive approach. Note that, both PGV and PoW will require additional time to verify the hashes which is 0.5 sec for PGV and 0.6 ms for PoW.
VI. RELATED WORK
In contrast with our coding based storage enforcement scheme, Golle et al. [7] have proposed a cryptographic primitive called storage enforcing commitment (SEC) which probabilistically guarantees that the server is using storage whose size is equal to the size of the original data to correctly answer the data possession queries. Dodis et al. [19] provided theoretical studies on different variants of existing POR scheme. Note that, one of variants in [19] is stucturally similar to poly hash but, we differ in adversarial modelling, storage enforcement property, proof techniques and the range of applications demonstration with experimental results.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents PGV (Pretty Good Verification), a multi-purpose storage enforcing remote verification scheme that utilizes polynomial hash for storage verification. In particular, its simplicity allows for bidirectional verification (i.e., client can verify that the server is storing its data and the server can verify that a (new) client has data that it is claiming to have). We prove [14] using a novel combination of Kolmogorov complexity and list decoding that the polynomial hash provides a strong storage enforcement property as well as proof of retrievability. Our experimental results support our claim of low overhead in pre-processing, token generation, verification, and extra storage space. Our overall results show that it is a good, practical choice for multi-purpose remote storage verification.
